





In	 the	 field	 of	 financial	 governance	 (the	 mechanisms	 that	 support	 the	 regulation	 and	
supervision	of	 the	 financial	markets)	 a	number	of	UK/EU	 legal	disputes	may	emerge	post-
‘Brexit’.	 This	 article	 examines	 the	UK’s	 current	 track	 record	 at	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	
European	 Union	 (‘CJEU’),	 and	 discusses	 some	 likely	 future	 challenges.	 In	 light	 of	 this,	 it	
considers	 which	 institutional	 frameworks	 should	 be	 used	 for	 resolving	 them.	 The	 article	
assesses	 the	 strengths	and	weaknesses	of	 three	potential	models	and	provides	an	original	
cross-model	 evaluation.	 It	 also	 discusses	 the	 associated	design	 challenges	 that	 EU	 and	UK	
negotiators	 may	 encounter	 in	 the	 attempt	 to	 devise	 a	 post-Brexit	 dispute	 settlement	
system.	 This	 timely	 contribution	 to	 the	 ongoing	 Brexit	 discussions	 addresses	 topical	 legal	
and	 regulatory	 issues	 in	 the	 UK/EU	 post-Brexit	 policy	 debate,	 especially	 the	 questions	
surrounding	the	important	area	of	financial	governance	and	dispute	resolution.		
The	article’s	analysis	is	qualified	by	the	following	observation;	it	proceeds	on	the	basis	that	
rational	 and	 functional	 interests	 and	 concerns	 should	 win	 out	 in	 the	 Brexit	 dispute	
settlement	negotiations.	Be	 that	as	 it	may,	 it	 is	 acknowledged	 that	Brexit	 is	not	a	 rational	
endeavour	and	that	the	withdrawal	negotiations	witnessed	to	date	do	not	necessarily	point	
to	such	interests	offering	a	reliable	guide	to	the	future	Brexit	arrangements.		
At	 the	 time	of	writing,	 both	 the	 date	 for	 the	UK’s	 departure	 from	 the	 EU,	 and	 the	 future	
nature	of	 the	UK/EU	 relationship	 remain	uncertain.	Although	 the	Draft	UK/EU	Withdrawal	
Agreement	and	 the	Future	Political	Declaration	have	been	endorsed	by	 the	 leaders	of	 the	
EU-27	and	the	UK’s	Prime	Minister,	 they	have	repeatedly	failed	to	make	 it	 through	the	UK	
Parliamentary	 process.1	Regardless	 of	 their	 final	 status,	 however,	 the	 Draft	 Withdrawal	






law	within	 the	EU	order,	as	a	matter	of	principle,	 it	may	not	be	the	appropriate	 forum	for	
dispute	 resolution	 between	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 EU.	 Rather,	 a	 standard	 feature	 of	 many	
international	 agreements	 is	 the	 use	 of	 an	 institutional	 forum	 that	 is	 independent	 of	 both	
jurisdictions	 and	 which	 can	 offer	 impartial	 oversight.	 Dispute	 resolution	 systems	 can	 also	
vary	 depending	 on	 the	 substance	 of	 an	 agreement	 in	 question,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 levels	 of	
mutual	 trust	 and	 cooperation	 that	 exist	 between	 the	 parties.	 Applying	 this	 to	 the	 field	 of	
UK/EU	financial	governance,	on	the	one	hand	a	close	future	partnership	may	be	envisaged,	
taking	account	of	the	long	shared	history	of	the	UK	and	the	EU	in	this	highly	regulated	and	
                                                      




dynamic	 area. 3 	At	 the	 same	 time,	 given	 the	 continually	 evolving	 nature	 of	 financial	




a	 future	agreement	as	well	 as	offering	effective	dispute	 resolution	when	 required.	On	 the	
other	 hand,	 given	 the	 unpredictable	 state	 of	 the	 Brexit	 situation,	 the	 precise	 level	 of	 any	
future	UK/EU	collaboration	remains	a	matter	of	on-going	speculation.	Yet	in	the	event	there	
is	either	no	agreement	(whether	with	respect	to	financial	governance	or	more	generally),	or	





scope	of	 the	 article;	 nonetheless,	 such	 variables	 should	be	borne	 in	mind	when	 surveying	
the	 potential	 institutional	 models	 as	 these	 could	 also	 affect	 the	 shape	 of	 a	 new	 dispute	
settlement	 system.	First,	 financial	governance	 is	only	one,	albeit	a	vital,	 issue	 in	 the	wider	
Brexit	dispute	settlement	endeavour.	For	instance,	how	the	Brexit	financial	settlement	plays	
out	 could	 influence	 the	 nature	 of	 any	 post-Brexit	 system.	 In	 brief,	 the	 Brexit	 financial	
settlement	sets	out	how	the	UK	and	EU	will	settle	their	outstanding	financial	commitments	
to	one	another	and	currently	 forms	part	of	 the	Draft	Withdrawal	Agreement.	 In	 the	event	
that	a	so-called	‘no	deal’	scenario	materialises,	however,	it	is	probable	that	a	combination	of	
political	 considerations	 and	 the	 level	 of	 appetite	 that	 emerges	 for	 a	 future	 UK/EU	
relationship	will	then	dictate	the	extent	to	which	financial	commitments	are	settled	and	vice	
versa.	 Particularly	 in	 the	 situation	 where	 the	 UK	 leaves	 the	 Union	 without	 making	 any	
payment	whatsoever,	 this	could	have	profound	consequences	on	 the	structure	of	a	 future	
UK/EU	arrangement.4			
	
Further,	 the	 EU	 guidelines	 on	 the	 framework	 for	 future	 EU/UK	 relations	may	 also	 impact	
upon	 the	 design	 of	 a	 new	 relationship.	 Particularly	 given	 EU	 concerns	 that	 UK	 businesses	
could	gain	unfair	competitive	advantages	post-Brexit	(such	as	via	regulatory	divergence),	the	
EU	guidelines	make	any	 future	agreement	dependent	on	there	being	sufficient	guarantees	
for	 a	 ‘level	 playing	 field’	 for	 EU	 and	 UK	 businesses,	 accompanied	 by	 adequate	 dispute	


















Accordingly	 such	 elements	 should	 be	 kept	 in	 mind	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 frameworks	 under	
examination.	
	
With	 this	 in	 mind,	 the	 overall	 thesis	 will	 be	 developed	 as	 follows:	 the	 first	 substantive	
section	 examines	 the	 UK’s	 recent	 legal	 challenges	 at	 the	 CJEU	 with	 respect	 to	 financial	
governance	disputes.	This	section	highlights	the	propensity	for	disagreements	to	emerge	in	
this	 swiftly	 evolving	 area.	 It	 also	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 the	 following	 section,	 which	 turns	 to	
explore	 the	 potential	 for	 post-Brexit	 financial	 governance	 disagreements	 to	 emerge,	
particularly	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 third-country	 equivalence	 process,	 as	 well	 as	 recent	 EU	
developments	in	relation	to	the	oversight	of	third-country	central	counterparties	(although	
technical,	 this	 sector	 matters	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 as	 a	 whole).	 This	 section	
identifies	 that	 there	are	a	number	of	difficulties	with	 the	UK	bringing	 such	applications	 to	
the	CJEU	but	that	in	principle	some	types	of	action	could	be	open	to	legal	review.	The	article	
then	 turns	 to	 analyse	 and	 evaluate	 the	 potential	 institutional	 structures	 that	 could	 be	
engaged	for	a	post-Brexit	system:	the	proposed	bilateral	Swiss/EU	institutional	framework;	
the	 regional	 EFTA	 Court,	 particularly	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 UK	 ‘docking’	 at	 it	 (in	 essence,	
enabling	 the	UK	 to	 access	 the	 EFTA	Court	without	 having	 to	 sign	 up	 for	 the	 full	 acquis	 of	
European	 Economic	 Area	 (‘EEA’)	 law);	 and	 the	 international	 World	 Trade	 Organisation	
(‘WTO’)	resolution	system.	
The	 issues	 in	 question	 are	 legally	 complex	 and	 political	 delicate	 and	 it	 is	 challenging	 to	
identify	 solutions	 that	 can	 balance	 both	 sides’	 expectations	 and	 ‘red	 lines’.	 The	 three	
institutional	 models	 that	 are	 evaluated	 all	 have	 their	 own	 pluses	 and	 minuses,	 and	 (as	
observed	above)	there	are	related	obstacles	that	may	be	encountered	in	developing	a	post-
Brexit	 system.	 The	 bilateral	 Swiss/EU	 situation	 is	 pertinent	 to	 reflect	 on	 as	 some	 notable	
similarities	 have	 emerged	 between	 the	 UK/EU	 and	 the	 Swiss/EU	 negotiations.	 First,	
Switzerland	is	neither	a	EU	Member	State	nor	an	EEA	State.	Next,	for	both	the	UK	and	the	
Swiss,	 the	 on-going	 negotiations	 are	 not	 between	 equals;	 it	 is	 the	 pitting	 of	 the	
supranational	 ‘club’	 of	 the	 EU	 against	 a	 non/soon	 to	 be	 non-member.	 The	 geographical	
proximity	 of	 both	 countries	 to	 the	 EU	 also	 affects	 the	 negotiations:	 the	 closer	 the	 non-
member,	the	greater	the	intensity	of	the	relationship.	Indeed,	Switzerland	has	indicated	that	
the	 EU	 can	 be	 observed	 connecting	 the	 conferral	 of	 single	 market	 access	 rights	 to	 the	
political	progress	of	the	Swiss	institutional	negotiations.6		The	EU	is	also	taking	care	to	treat	
the	UK	and	Switzerland	pari	passu;	 it	 does	not	wish	 to	 set	precedents	 for	one	 jurisdiction	
that	the	other	may	then	claim.		
If	 a	 close	 future	alliance	 can	emerge	 then	 the	Swiss/EU	draft	 framework	 (that	 is	 currently	
applied	 in	 the	Draft	UK/EU	Withdrawal	Agreement)	 could	be	utilised,	however,	 the	 article	
suggests	that	the	innovative	EFTA	docking	solution	may	be	preferable,	subject	to	building	in	
the	 necessary	 adaptations.	 The	 EFTA	 model	 is	 more	 intricate	 but	 it	 can	 also	 offer	 more	
leeway,	 including	in	relation	to	respecting	the	UK’s	stance	on	the	CJEU.	Such	a	route	could	
include	 the	UK	 securing	 a	 future	bespoke	 agreement	with	 the	 EU	 (rather	 than	 joining	 the	
EEA,	 the	 so-called	 ‘Norway	 option’)	whilst	 granting	 the	 EFTA	 institutions	 a	 role	 in	 dispute	
resolution.	Ideologically,	this	could	have	attractions	for	the	UK;	EFTA	is	not	a	supranational	
institution	 and	 it	 has	 a	 different	 ethos	 focused	 on	 free	 trade	 rather	 than	 the	 pursuit	 of	
further	political	integration.	Moreover,	the	EU	has	accepted	the	EFTA	Court	system,	and	has	
in	the	past	offered	it	as	a	solution	to	the	Swiss	situation,	suggesting	this	may	be	acceptable	
to	 it.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 could	hit	 the	 same	political	 roadblocks	as	 the	Draft	Withdrawal	
                                                      




jurisdictional	 complexities	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 current	 EFTA	 model	 to	
equivalence	 disputes,	 although	 the	 mutual	 respect	 that	 has	 developed	 over	 the	 years	
between	the	EFTA	Court	and	CJEU	may	moderate	this	to	an	extent.	
If	 the	 future	negotiations	deteriorate,	 however,	 then	a	 looser	 arrangement	 that	 draws	on	
the	international	WTO	model	may	be	the	only	realistic	system	on	which	to	start	designing	a	
future	dispute	settlement	system.	The	WTO	has	a	well-developed,	 largely	successful	quasi-
judicial	 system.	 This	 could	 be	 utilised	 in	 the	 UK/EU’s	 future	 arrangements,	 including	with	
respect	to	financial	governance	disputes.	Although	the	WTO	is	not	a	standard-setter	and	the	
question	of	market	access	rights	to	EU	would	remain	dependent	(in	the	first	instance)	on	the	




There	 are	 limitations	 to	 this	 procedure,	 including	 how	 far	 the	 regime	 can	 engage	 in	 the	
review	of	particular	EU/UK	disputes	concerning	equivalence,	yet	 the	WTO	may	be	open	to	
policing	unjustified	denials	or	revocations	of	access	determinations.8	Moreover	although	the	
WTO’s	 Appellate	 Body	 currently	 faces	 existential	 challenges	 due	 to	 the	 US	 blocking	
appointments,	 a	 number	 of	 functional	 solutions	 have	 been	 mooted	 that	 may	 ensure	 it	
remains	 operational.	 Although	 it	 remains	 unclear	 whether	 or	 not	 such	 systems	 will	 be	
sufficient,9	in	principle	 such	mechanisms	 could	be	 transferable	 in	 relation	 to	 future	UK/EU	







This	 section	 considers	 the	 UK’s	 long-standing	 role	 as	 a	 major	 influence	 and	 check	 and	
balance	in	relation	to	EU	competence	with	respect	to	financial	governance.	It	demonstrates	
that	 given	 the	dynamic	 nature	of	 the	 field	 of	 financial	 governance,	 challenges	 to	 the	 EU’s	
competence	can	quickly	emerge.	Further,	 in	more	recent	years,	as	the	UK	has	struggled	to	
maintain	its	influence	in	shaping	new	EU	laws	directly	at	the	negotiating	table,	it	has	instead	
taken	 challenges	 to	 the	CJEU.	 This	 section	provides	 the	bedrock	 for	 the	 following	 section,	
                                                      
7	K.	Alexander,	 ‘The	UK's	Third-Country	Status	Following	Brexit’	 in	Brexit	and	Financial	Services:	Law	
and	Policy	(Hart	2018)	139.	







11	G.	Messenger,	 ‘Membership	of	 the	WTO’	 in	Michael	Dougan	 (ed),	The	UK	after	Brexit:	 Legal	 and	
Policy	Challenges	(Intersentia	2017)	235.	
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which	 then	 highlights	 the	 prospect	 of	 post-Brexit	 legal	 challenges	 emerging	 in	 respect	 of	
financial	services.		
	
With	 respect	 to	 the	 field	of	 financial	governance,	 the	UK’s	 financial	 sector	 is	 the	 largest	 in	
Europe;	it	is	sometimes	described	as	the	EU’s	investment	banker.12	As	a	Member	State,	the	
UK	has	had	voting	power	within	 the	EU	 institutions,	via	 the	widely	used	qualified	majority	
voting	 (‘QMV’)	 procedure	 in	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 EU	 (the	 ‘Council’).13	Although	 analyses	 of	
voting	behaviour	show	that	 the	Council	does	not	always	vote	 formally,	preferring	to	reach	
consensus,	 factors	 influencing	 the	 outcome	 of	 QMV	 decisions	 may	 include	 Presidency	
preferences,	coalition	 forming,	and	 ‘horse	trading’.14		Especially	 in	 the	pre-global	crisis	era,	
the	UK	was	often	an	authoritative	voice	with	 respect	 to	 financial	governance,	given	 it	had	
much	subject-specific	expertise.15		Moreover,	it	could	also	trade	favours	with	other	countries	
when	 they	did	not	have	a	 ‘dog	 in	 the	 fight’	 in	 return	 for	 support	on	 their	 vital	 interests.16		
More	 recently,	 however,	 the	UK’s	 approach	 fell	 from	 favour	 following	 the	global	 crisis.	 Its	
influence	 at	 the	 negotiating	 table	 waned	 (and	 announcing	 its	 departure	 from	 the	 Union	
proved	 to	 be	 a	 further	 large	 nail	 in	 its	 coffin).	 	 Taken	 together,	 it	 has	 become	 more	
challenging	 for	 the	 UK	 to	 secure	 blocking	 coalitions	 in	 the	 Council.	 For	 instance,	 on	 the	
bankers’	bonus	cap	(which	restricted	bonuses	to	100	per	cent	of	pay,	or	200	per	cent	with	
shareholder	approval)	no	other	Member	State	was	willing	to	support	the	UK’s	opposition.17		





Starting	 with	 its	 one	 (limited)	 victory	 at	 the	 CJEU,	 this	 was	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 clearing	 of	
financial	 contracts	 (derivatives).	 The	 UK	 has	 a	 well-established	 euro-derivatives	 clearing	
business.	This	fairly	obscure	(but	also	crucial)	sector	of	clearing	is	the	mechanism	by	which	a	








14	See	 e.g.	 T.	 Börzel,	 ‘Member	 State	 Responses	 to	 Europeanization’	 (2002)	 40	 Journal	 of	 Common	
Market	Studies	193.	
15	D.	Howarth	and	L.	Quaglia	(n	12).		
16 	D.	 Leal-Olivas,	 ‘Brexit	 Redraws	 EU	 Alliances’	 Politico	 	 <https://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-
redraws-eu-alliances-coalitions-stop-france-and-germany-deeper-integration/>	 accessed	 11	 October	
2018;	N.	Moloney,	‘‘Bending	to	Uniformity’:	EU	Financial	Regulation	with	and	without	the	UK’	(2017)	




17	In	particular,	the	UK	argued	this	 legislation	was	not	fit	 for	purpose;	the	provisions	would	 increase	






a	 buyer	 and	 seller.19		 A	 clearinghouse	 (such	 as	 the	 London	 Stock	 Exchange’s	 LCH)	 stands	
between	the	two	parties	as	a	CCP	and	insulates	the	rest	of	the	market	if	there	is	a	default.	
The	City	of	London	is	the	dominant	global	location	for	clearing	derivatives	trades,	including	
the	 euro;	 and	 it	 became	 even	 more	 significant	 following	 the	 post-crisis	 G20	 moves	 to	
centrally	clear	over-the-counter	contracts.20		
	
The	 location	of	 (what	 can	now	be)	 systemically	 important	 clearing	 facilities	has	 long	been	
contentious	 (and	 tensions	 have	 been	 reignited	 due	 to	 Brexit,	 as	 will	 be	 discussed	 further	




In	2015	 the	CJEU	annulled	 the	policy	 in	 so	 far	as	 it	 set	a	 requirement	 for	CCPs	 involved	 in	









The	 three	other	CJEU	 challenges	were	unsuccessful.	 First,	 as	 identified	 above,	 the	UK	was	
isolated	in	the	negotiations	leading	to	the	EU	rules	capping	bankers’	bonuses.	At	the	CJEU,	
its	legal	challenges	included	the	EU’s	lack	of	competence	to	regulate	pay,22	but	it	withdrew	




tax	 (‘FTT’),	 which	 would	 generate	 a	 new	 source	 of	 income	 from	 the	 financial	 sector.	 The	
proposed	tax	would	have	extra-territorial	effects,	including	transactions	in	non-participating	
jurisdictions,	provided	one	party	was	located	in	a	participating	Member	State,	or	where	the	
parties	were	trading	financial	 instruments	 issued	in	a	participating	Member	State.24		 In	this	
                                                      















instance,	 the	UK	 suffered	an	early	 stage	defeat	 in	 its	 attempt	 to	 rein	 in	 the	 FTT,	 although	









intervention	 powers	 under	 the	 Short	 Selling	 Regulation	 on	 a	 range	 of	 legal	 grounds,	





Taken	 together,	 the	 UK’s	 victories	 at	 the	 CJEU	 have	 been	 few,	 and	 even	 the	 one	 success	
concerned	 a	 relatively	 niche	 aspect	 of	 its	 application.	 Despite	 the	 UK’s	 rather	 poor	 track	
record,	as	 the	next	section	considers,	a	number	of	possible	 future	challenges	 in	 respect	of	
financial	services	could	now	emerge	due	to	Brexit,	whether	during	the	transition	period	(if	
this	 transpires)	 and	 thereafter.	 Financial	 governance	 is	 a	 highly	 dynamic	 and	 heavily	
regulated	 area,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 areas	 could	 be	 ripe	 for	 challenge.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	
likelihood	and	level	of	complaints	may	depend	not	only	the	questions	of	substance	but	also	
the	 levels	of	 trust	between	 the	 jurisdictions.	 Indeed,	 given	 the	 current,	 shaky	 state	of	 the	








This	 section	 analyses	 the	 prospects	 for	 future	 disagreements	 in	 respect	 of	 post-Brexit	
financial	governance.	 	With	respect	to	future	 legal	complaints,	the	general	starting	point	 is	
that	 there	 could	 be	 implementation	 disputes.	 This	 could	 involve,	 for	 example,	 one	 party	




2013).	Note	 that	 the	FTT	project	 continues	 to	be	debated	by	 ten	participating	countries	 (under	 the	









arguing	 that	 the	 other	 is	 not	 appropriately	 implementing	 the	 relevant	 UK/EU	 agreement.	
There	could	also	be	challenges	with	respect	to	subsequent	executive	actions	(such	as	the	EU	
making	 equivalence	 determination,	 including	 the	 threat	 or	 actual	 revocation	 of	 an	
equivalence	 assessment).29		 Moreover,	 there	 could	 be	 legal	 challenges	 in	 relation	 to	 EU	
legislative	 action,	 where	 this	 has	 or	 could	 impact	 negatively	 on	 third-country	 sectors	 and	
actors.			
	




stability	of	 the	 financial	system).	 It	 suggests	 that	a	number	of	difficulties	may	arise	 for	 the	
UK	 in	 bringing	 such	 legal	 applications	 but	 that	 in	 theory	 some	 types	 of	 executive	 and	








a	 third	 country,	 it	 will	 be	 required	 to	 use	 these	 third	 country/equivalence	 mechanisms	
(where	 these	 exist)	 to	 secure	 limited	 access	 to	 the	 single	 market.	 This	 is	 an	 imperfect	






treatment	 of	 access	 by	 US	 CCPs	 to	 the	 EU	 derivatives	markets	 and	 vice	 versa).31		 On	 the	
other,	 the	 recent	 time-limited	 and	 conditional	 equivalence	 decision	 on	 the	 Swiss	 stock	
exchanges	 illustrates	 a	more	 inflexible	 stance	 (in	 contrast,	 the	US	 and	 also	 the	 Australian	
exchanges	were	recognised	on	an	unlimited	basis).32	The	EU	justified	its	approach	based	on	
the	tightly	interwoven	nature	of	the	Swiss/EU	relationship	and	the	knock-on	implications	for	
market	 access	 compared	 with	 a	 jurisdiction	 such	 as	 Australia,	 which	 would	 never	 be	











Implementing	 Decision	 on	 the	 Equivalence	 of	 the	 Legal	 and	 Supervisory	 Framework	 in	 Australia	
Applicable	to	Financial	Markets	(2017/2318).	
 9 
accessing	 the	EU	market	 in	 the	 same	way.33	The	 Swiss	 equivalence	decision	was	extended	
for	a	further	six	months	in	December	2018;34	however,	this	decision	then	lapsed	without	the	
EU	renewing	it	on	30	June	2019.35		As	will	be	discussed	further	below,	all	such	developments	
were	 also	 connected	 to	 the	 Swiss/EU	 constitutional	 negotiations,	 suggesting	 that	
equivalence	 decisions	 may	 take	 on	 political	 salience,	 reflecting	 wider	 EU	 motivations	 in	
play.36			
	
The	 process	 also	 lacks	 transparency.	 Third	 countries	 have	 no	 ‘right’	 to	 be	 assessed,	 and	
although	 the	 criteria	 for	 performing	 the	 equivalence	 assessment	 will	 be	 contained	 in	 the	
relevant	 financial	 services	 legislation,	 the	 Commission	 decision	 will	 be	 discretionary	 in	
accordance	with	 that	 empowerment.37		 The	Commission’s	 2017	 Statement	on	Equivalence	
also	suggests	that	in	addition	to	the	specified	equivalence	criteria	and	the	Treaty	objectives,	








unilateral	 discretion	 to	withdraw	an	equivalence	decision	on	 short	 notice.40		 Although	 this	
system	 is	 also	 the	 quid	 pro	 quo	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 third	 countries	 can	 make	 their	 own	
determinations	on	whether	to	grant	EU	access	to	their	markets,	and	can	change	their	own	
regimes	as	they	see	fit,	 it	 remains	an	 imperfect	system	for	governing	a	 future	(potentially)	
intimate	UK/EU	relationship.41		
C	 Can	the	CJEU	Review	Equivalence	Decisions?	
                                                      
33	G.	 Baur	 (n	 6);	 ‘EU	 Doesn't	 See	 Case	 for	 Green	 Light	 on	 Swiss	 Stock	 Exchange’	 Bloomberg	 (28	
November	2018).	
34	Commission,	 Implementing	 Decision	 of	 20	 December	 2018	 on	 the	 Equivalence	 of	 the	 Legal	 and	
Supervisory	Framework	Applicable	to	Stock	Exchanges	in	Switzerland	(2018/2047).	
35	See	e.g.	‘EU-Based	Traders	Caught	in	Swiss	‘Equivalence’	Spat’	Financial	Times	(30	June	2019).	




















equivalence	 process	 to	 commence;	 nor	 easily	 challenge	 the	 Commission	 for	 failing	 to	 act	
where	it	is	not	required	to	do	so.		
	
Where	 a	 Commission	 equivalence	 decision	 has	 been	 made,	 its	 legality	 may	 be	 open	 to	
judicial	review	by	the	CJEU.	Under	article	263	TFEU,	the	Court	has	the	jurisdiction	to	review	
the	 legality	of	acts	of	 the	EU	 institutions	and	can	annul	 illegal	acts.	43	In	 terms	of	 standing,	
such	 challenges	 can	 most	 easily	 be	 brought	 by	 a	 Member	 State,	 or	 one	 of	 the	 main	 EU	
institutions	(‘privileged	applicants’).44		In	principle,	any	natural	or	legal	person	(whether	from	
a	 EU	 or	 a	 non-EU	 State)	 can	 also	 have	 standing	 as	 ‘non-privileged’	 applicants	 although	
restrictive	 standing	 conditions	 are	 placed	 on	 such	 persons	 under	 article	 263(4).	45		 Such	
requirements	 have	 generally	 also	 been	 interpreted	 strictly	 by	 the	 CJEU,	 meaning	 the	
likelihood	 of	 securing	 standing	 is	 limited.46		 Moreover	 although	 a	 non-privileged	 person	
(such	as	a	UK	 firm)	 could	 try	 to	 satisfy	 the	 ‘Lisbon	 limb’	of	article	263(4),	which	enables	a	
challenge	 to	a	 regulatory	act	 (and	which	 could	 cover	equivalence	decisions),	 there	 remain	






                                                      
42	See	European	Parliament,	Third-Country	Equivalence	in	EU	Banking	Legislation	(July	2017)	5.	
43	Although	 not	 in	 the	 financial	 governance	 domain,	 see	 e.g.	 C-362/14	 Schrems	 v	 Data	 Protection	
Commissioner	EU:C:2015:650	where	 the	CJEU	 found	data	equivalence	arrangements	with	 the	US	 to	
be	invalid.	This	led	to	a	more	restricted	equivalence	set-up	being	put	in	place.	
44	As	privileged	applicants,	the	Member	States,	Parliament,	Council	and	Commission	have	automatic	
standing	 (they	 are	 presumed	 to	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 the	 legality	 of	 EU	 acts).	 There	 are	 also	 ‘semi-











the	Level	one	 regulation	or	directive.	Albors-Llorens	 identifies	 that	 the	Lisbon	 reforms	 in	art	263(4)	
offer	an	important	new	dimension	to	the	use	of	this	plea	meaning	this	could	be	more	viable.	In	this	
regard	 see	 the	 Inuit	 litigation,	 although	 these	 cases	 also	 reiterate	 the	 hurdles	 to	 gaining	 access	 (in	
Inuit	I,	the	Lisbon	limb	was	held	inapplicable	and	the	applicants	did	not	surpass	the	general	standing	
test;	in	Inuit	II	the	question	of	admissibility	was	not	explored	and	the	application	failed	on	substantive	
grounds),	 Case	 C-583/11P	 Inuit	 Tapiriit	 Kanatami	 v	 Parliament	 and	 Council	 (Inuit	 I)	EU:C:2013:625;	
Case	T-526/10	Inuit	Tapiriit	Kanatami	v	Commission	(Inuit	II)	EU:T:2013:215	(a	subsequent	appeal	was	




Subsequent	 to	 this,	 however	 (and	 although	 subject	 to	 what	 agreements	 are	 finalised	
between	the	UK	and	EU),	recourse	to	the	CJEU	could	then	depend	on	another	sympathetic	




With	 respect	 to	 an	EU	 institution	bringing	 a	 legal	 complaint,	 it	 could	be	 the	 case	 that	 the	
European	 Parliament	 (the	 ‘Parliament’)	 chooses	 to	 bring	 an	 action.	 This	 EU	 institution	 is	
playing	an	 increasingly	prominent	role	 in	EU	financial	governance,	and	 it	has	called	for	the	
Commission	to	be	‘held	more	directly	accountable’.48	It	also	recently	advocated	introducing	
a	more	 consistent,	 transparent	 and	 practical	 equivalence	 framework.49	At	 the	 same	 time,	
this	 is	 not	 a	 fail-safe	 mechanism.	 How	 enthusiastic	 the	 Parliament	 may	 be	 to	 come	 to	 a	











with	 the	 precedent	 concerning	 the	 Swiss	 stock	 exchange	 decisions,	 contentions	 could	
include	 that	 an	 equivalence	 decision,	 or	 its	 revocation,	 does	 not	 have	 a	 valid	 legal	 basis.	
Admittedly	 there	are	clear	difficulties	 in	making	such	a	case	given	there	 is	no	requirement	
for	 a	 formal	 Commission	 decision	 where	 equivalence	 is	 denied.	 Yet	 in	 principle,	 a	 legal	
argument	 could	 be	 pursued	 via	 a	 comparison	 of	 the	 UK’s	 regulatory	 and	 supervisory	
framework	 with	 that	 of	 the	 EU’s. 51 	In	 line	 with	 the	 analysis	 explored	 above,	 such	 a	
comparative	exercise	could	be	used	to	advance	an	argument	that	(for	instance)	a	particular	
decision	has	not	been	based	on	objective	regulatory	reasons	in	accordance	with	the	relevant	
equivalence	 criteria	 in	 the	 legislation	 and	 the	 Treaty	objectives.	 Rather	 (and	 connected	 to	
the	article’s	earlier	discussion	on	the	equivalence	process)	the	contention	would	be	that	 it	
concerns	 unrelated	 factors	 and	 wider	 external	 policy	 priorities	 beyond	 the	 equivalence	
criteria	and	Treaty	objectives	(including	the	conduct	of	the	UK/EU	negotiations).52		
                                                      
48	European	Parliament,	Report	on	the	EU	Role	in	the	Framework	of	International	Financial,	Monetary	
and	Regulatory	Institutions	and	Bodies	A8-0027/2016	(2016).	














CCP	 oversight.	 Although	 as	 identified	 above,	 the	 UK	won	 a	 limited	 victory	 at	 the	 CJEU	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 location	 policy	 concerning	 euro-dominated	 contracts,	 tensions	 have	
escalated	 since	 the	 Brexit	 vote,	 not	 least	 in	 relation	 to	 concerns	 about	 euro-clearing	
occurring	offshore	in	the	UK.53		
	
Although	 arcane,	 the	 CCP	 sector	 is	 extremely	 important	 to	 the	 overall	 stability	 and	
effectiveness	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 as	 a	 whole.	 In	 particular,	 due	 to	 the	 post-crisis	
developments	 to	 centrally	 clear	over-the-counter	 contracts,	 CCPs	 can	now	be	 systemically	
important	entities.	Moreover,	the	City	of	London	is	the	key	location	for	CCP	services	in	the	
EU,	and	the	largest	clearing	houses	engaging	in	euro-denominated	transactions	are	located	
in	 the	 City	 (for	 instance	 in	 relation	 to	 interest	 rate	 derivatives	 in	 the	 EU,	 around	 three	
quarters	 (of	 total	outstanding	notional)	of	 these	trades	have	been	estimated	to	 take	place	
between	 a	 group	 of	 dealers	 and/or	 banks	 all	 based	 in	 the	 City).54	As	 the	 UK’s	 pre-Brexit	




Indeed	 since	 the	 earlier	 CJEU	 CCP	 ruling,	 and	 in	 light	 of	 Brexit,	 the	 ECB	 has	 proposed	
amending	its	statutes	so	that	it	has	authority	to	supervise	CCPs	and	to	ensure	the	UK’s	CJEU	
argument	can	no	longer	be	used.55		Moreover,	although	ESMA	has	granted	one-year	licences	
to	London’s	clearinghouses	to	enable	them	to	continue	to	clear	 trades	 in	 the	event	of	any	
‘hard’	Brexit,56	there	are	CCP	Proposals	(on	which	provisional	agreement	has	recently	been	
reached)	 that	 envisage	 tougher	oversight	of	 third	 country	CCPs	 (sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	
‘EMIR	 2.2’).	 This	 includes	 increased	 supervisory	 and	 enforcement	 competence	 for	 ESMA	
with	 respect	 to	 third	 country	 CCPs.57	ESMA’s	mandate	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 number	 of	 detailed	
procedural	conditions,	but	 the	outcome	of	 the	process	could	 in	effect	compel	systemically	
important	UK-based	CCPs	to	relocate	to	a	Member	State	in	order	to	have	market	access.58		
                                                                                                                                                            
EU	 frameworks	 as	 equivalent	 going	 forward,	 FCA,	 The	 Temporary	 Permissions	 Regime	 for	 Inbound	
Passporting	EEA	Firms	and	Funds	–	Our	Approach	(July	2018).	
53	N.	Moloney,	 ‘Brexit	 and	Financial	 Services:	 (yet)	Another	Re-Ordering	of	 Institutional	Governance	
for	the	EU	Financial	System?’	(n	31)	181-182.	
54	K.	 Lannoo	 (n	20)	1;	European	Systemic	Risk	Board,	Shedding	Light	on	Dark	Markets:	First	 Insights	
from	the	New	EU-Wide	OTC	Derivatives	Dataset	(May	2016).	
55	ECB,	Recommendation	for	a	Decision	Amending	Article	22	of	the	Statute	of	the	European	System	of	
Central	Banks	and	of	 the	ECB	C212/14	 (2017);	Y.	Mersch,	ECB:	Euro	Clearing	 -	 the	Open	Race	 (May	
2018);	K.	Lannoo,	Derivatives	Clearing	and	Brexit:	ECMI	Policy	Brief	No.	25	/	November	2017	 (2017).	




57	Commission,	Proposal	 for	a	Regulation	as	Regards	CCPs	and	Requirements	 for	 the	Recognition	of	
Third-Country	CCPs	COM(2017)	331	(2017),	art	25(2c).			
58	Ibid	art	25(2c).	In	this	regard,	the	Parliament’s	report	on	the	Commission	Proposals	retained	the	so-
called	 ‘location	 policy’	 but	 proposed	 means	 to	 make	 such	 decisions	 more	 proportionate	 and	 to	
introduce	 a	 more	 evidence-based	 analysis	 (costs	 and	 benefits)	 into	 the	 process.	 The	 Council’s	
 13 
	
Such	 developments	 could	 pave	 the	 way	 for	 a	 future	 judicial	 challenge.	 For	 instance,	 an	
application	 could	 emerge	 from	 ESMA’s	 operational	 approach	 to	 its	 supervisory	 and	
enforcement	 responsibilities,	 including	 whether	 its	 mandate	 breaches	 its	 Treaty	
competency.	A	substantive	challenge	could	also	derive	from	an	ESMA	recommendation	(and	
the	accompanying	Commission	decision)	 to	 refuse	CCP	 recognition.	 In	 line	with	 the	above	




Again,	 the	 UK	 can	 only	 directly	 bring	 such	 challenges	 via	 the	 CJEU	 during	 the	 transition	
period.	Following	this	 (and,	again,	subject	to	what	agreements	are	concluded	between	the	
UK/EU),	 with	 respect	 to	 CCPs,	 it	 could	 the	 case	 that	 other	Member	 States	 are	 willing	 to	
commence	 legal	 action,	 such	 as	 alleging	 a	 breach	 of	 Treaty	 competency	 if	 disgruntled	 at	
ESMA’s	 increased	 direct	 operational	 ambit.	 Indeed	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 ESMA	
‘location	 policy’	 decision	 involves	 ESMA	 making	 policy	 choices	 with	 distributional	
consequences	 (including	 raising	 costs	 for	businesses,	which	 could	 impact	 some	more	 than	
others),	 and	which	pushes	at	 the	boundary	of	ESMA’s	 remit.60		 This	 is	not	 least	 given	 that	
CCPs	are	often	considered	a	special	case	of	systemically	important	market	entities	compared	
with	many	 other	 elements	 of	 the	 financial	 system.	 Again,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 are	 no	






respect	 to	 financial	 services	and	that	 the	UK	will	 face	various	 impediments	bringing	 future	
applications.	This	raises	the	related	question;	specifically,	what	is	the	appropriate	forum	to	
hear	 such	 legal	 challenges?	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 arguments	 can	 be	 advanced	 that	 the	 CJEU	
should	the	arena	for	resolving	post-Brexit	disagreements.	First,	the	CJEU	is	the	authority	on	




situation,	 additional	 protections	 could	be	built	 into	 the	 system.	 For	 instance	 the	UK	 could	
have	the	right	to	intervene	in	all	cases	before	the	CJEU	as	well	as	being	conferred	the	right	
                                                                                                                                                            
Compromise	also	described	such	decisions	as	a	‘last	resort’	and	in	line	with	the	Parliament,	sought	to	
ensure	decisions	will	be	made	on	a	quantitative	technical	assessment,	European	Parliament,	Report	
on	 CCP	 Proposals	 A8-0190/2018	 (May	 2018);	 ECOFIN,	 Presidency	 Compromise	 Proposal	 14496/18	
(November	2018).		
59	Davis	Polk,	Proposals	to	Amend	the	EMIR	Supervisory	Regime	(June	2017).	
60 	HM	 Treasury,	 Letter	 from	 John	 Glen	 to	 European	 Scrutiny	 Committee	 on	 CCP	 Proposals	 (21	










EU	 law,	 and	 where	 the	 CJEU’s	 input	 may	 be	 especially	 valuable.	 Over	 the	 longer	 term,	
however,	as	a	matter	of	principle,	it	may	be	undesirable	for	the	CJEU	to	be	selected	as	the	
final	 forum	 for	 resolving	 future	 UK/EU	 disagreements.	 Specifically,	 a	 standard	 feature	 of	
many	 international	agreements	 is	 that	they	do	not	tend	to	give	one	party	 jurisdiction	over	
the	other	when	resolving	disputes.63		In	this	regard,	the	alternative	of	a	neutral	arena,	rather	
than	the	CJEU,	for	post-Brexit	dispute	settlement	would	offer	a	fair	and	impartial	means	of	
resolving	 disagreements.64	Moreover,	 such	 a	 system	 could	 also	 be	 tailored	 in	 order	 to	
provide	for	the	option	of	a	party	making	a	voluntary	reference	to	the	CJEU.			
	
In	 this	 regard,	 the	 following	 section	 considers	 the	proposed	dispute	 settlement	provisions	
within	the	UK/EU	Draft	documentation.	Although	its	status	remains	hazy,	and	it	has	failed	to	
be	 approved	 by	 the	 UK	 House	 of	 Commons	 on	multiple	 occasions,	 its	 dispute	 settlement	
aspects	 merit	 reflection.	 They	 amount	 to	 a	 delicate	 combination	 of	 political	 discussion,	
arbitration,	 plus	 a	 role	 for	 the	 CJEU.	 This	 analysis	 also	 provides	 the	 launching	 pad	 for	 the	
article’s	next	part,	where,	given	the	unpredictable	outcome	of	the	UK/EU	negotiations,	and	







transition	 period;	 the	Withdrawal	Agreement	 as	 it	 applies	 after	 the	 transition	 period;	 and	
the	 future	 arrangements	 to	 govern	 UK	 and	 EU	 relations	 over	 the	 longer	 term.	 The	 Draft	
UK/EU	Withdrawal	Agreement	(the	‘WA’)	provides	that	during	any	transition	period,	the	UK	






Many	 provisions	 within	 the	 Draft	 Withdrawal	 Agreement	 (‘WA’),	 including	 most	 of	 the	
dispute	 resolution	 provisions	 only	 apply	 from	 the	 end	 of	 the	 transition	 period.	 There	 are	










particular	 provisions	 to	 enable	 UK	 courts	 to	 request	 a	 preliminary	 CJEU	 ruling	 on	 the	
interpretation	 of	 the	 provisions	 on	 citizens’	 rights	 in	 the	WA	where	 necessary	 for	 the	 UK	
court	to	give	judgment	(this	jurisdiction	runs	for	an	eight	year	period	post-transition).66		The	
CJEU	 also	 has	 jurisdiction	 with	 respect	 to	 particular	 financial	 settlement	 provisions	 (no	





arrangements	 suggested	 in	 the	 Swiss/EU	 draft	 agreement	 (both	 examined	 later	 in	 the	
article).	Under	the	WA,	the	UK	and	EU	must	first	seek	to	resolve	issues	via	consultation	with	
the	 to-be	 established	 political	 forum,	 the	 Joint	 Committee	 (which	 will	 comprise	 of	
representatives	 from	the	UK	and	 the	EU).69	If	no	mutually	agreed	solution	has	been	 found	






The	 arbitration	 process	 is	 based	 on	 general	 international	 law,	 although	 where	 a	 dispute	
raises	an	issue	on	a	question	of	interpretation	of	a	concept	of	EU	law	(which	includes	such	a	
question	 in	 the	 WA,	 plus	 questions	 concerning	 the	 UK	 complying	 with	 CJEU	 judgments	
during	the	transition,	and	four	years	subsequent	where	this	concerns	the	UK’s	failure	to	fulfil	
the	WA	or	 EU	Treaty	obligations)	 the	Panel	 shall	 refer	 this	 to	 the	CJEU.	 The	 ruling	will	 be	




issue	 in	 question	 does	 not	 concern	 the	 interpretation	 of	 EU	 law	 or	 the	 UK’s	 obligations	











71	Ibid	 art	 174;	 Opinion	 1/92	 (only	 the	 CJEU	 can	 give	 an	 interpretation	 of	 EU	 law	 that	 binds	 the	








The	 final	 Panel	 ruling	 binds	 both	 sides.74	If	 there	 is	 non-compliance,	 the	 Panel	 can	 grant	
temporary	remedies	(including	penalty	payments	and	lump	sums).	In	the	event	of	continued	
failure	 to	 comply	 or	 of	 non-payment,	 the	 complainant	 can	 temporarily	 suspend	 any	
provision	 in	 the	WA	(other	 than	 those	on	citizens’	 rights,	or	parts	of	any	other	agreement	
between	the	EU	and	UK).75		These	processes	are	also	broadly	in	sync	with	the	WTO	model.	
	
Overall,	 the	 Draft	WA’s	 dispute	 resolution	 provisions	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 an	 attempt	 at	 a	
careful	 balancing	 act	 between	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 EU’s	 red	 lines	 on	 the	 CJEU,	 using	 a	
combination	of	(mainly)	political	channels	plus	arbitration	and	the	input	of	the	CJEU	where	
required.	Moreover,	 unlike	 the	 Commission’s	 original	 draft	 of	 the	WA,	which	 envisaged	 a	




with	 the	 less	 prominent	 role	 for	 the	 CJEU)	 to	 prove	 controversial.77	At	 the	 same	 time,	
however	(as	observed	above)	disputes	involving	the	WA	also	have	much	potential	to	involve	
questions	 of	 EU	 law,	 necessitating	 the	 CJEU’s	 contribution.	 In	 this	 regard,	 over	 the	 short-
medium	 term,	 several	more	CJEU	 judgments	on	 the	UK	may	be	envisaged.78	On	 the	other	






The	 Draft	 Political	 Declaration	 that	 accompanies	 the	 Draft	 WA	 is	 a	 light-touch	 and	 non-
binding	text.	Yet	it	does	offer	some	suggestions	as	to	the	general	direction	of	travel	for	the	
future	arrangements.80		With	 respect	 to	 the	dispute	 resolution	provisions,	 it	proposes	 that	





                                                      
74	Draft	UK/EU	Withdrawal	Agreement	(as	Endorsed	by	the	European	Council)	2018,	art	175.	


















Where	 a	 party	 fails	 to	 comply	with	 a	 Panel’s	 ruling	within	 a	 reasonable	 period,	 the	 other	






Taken	 together,	 the	 Draft	 WA	 and	 Political	 Declaration	 envisage	 a	 system	 of	 political	
consultation,	 arbitration,	 plus	 a	 role	 for	 the	 CJEU.	 Yet,	 at	 the	 time	 of	writing,	 their	 status	
remains	 in	 limbo.	 	 Moreover,	 the	 Political	 Declaration	 has	 no	 formal	 legal	 status,	 and	
understandably	 leaves	 the	 specifics	 with	 respect	 to	 any	 future	 UK/EU	 legal	 relationship	
largely	unclear.		
	
This	 is	 a	 legally	 intricate	 and	 politically	 delicate	 area	 and	 it	 is	 exacting	 to	 develop	 a	
framework	that	reflect	both	the	UK’s	and	the	EU’s	expectations.	In	this	regard,	the	Draft	WA	
amounts	 to	 a	 fragile	 accord,	 with	 its	 focus	 on	 arbitration	 plus	 the	 use	 of	 the	 CJEU	 on	





should	 not	 be	 the	 institution	 in	 charge	 of	 resolving	 equivalence	 and	 other	 legal	 disputes	
arising	between	the	two	sides.84		Although	the	case	can	be	made	for	selecting	it	as	the	forum	
for	 post-Brexit	 dispute	 resolution	 (with	 additional	 protections	 introduced	 to	 cater	 for	 the	
UK’s	 position), 85 	it	 is	 undesirable	 for	 one	 party	 to	 an	 international	 agreement	 to	 be	
responsible	 for	 marking	 its	 own	 homework.	 Rather,	 international	 agreements	 may	 be	




could	 be	 utilised	 to	 engage	 in	 oversight	 and	 dispute	 settlement	 concerning	 the	 range	 of	
decisions	 and	 determinations	 taking	 place.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 UK	 in	 particular	 should	
remain	 mindful	 as	 to	 the	 realities;	 most	 notably,	 the	 EU	 will	 be	 reluctant	 to	 start	 from	























close	 to	 relatively-close	 relationship	 may	 be	 conceivable	 between	 the	 UK	 and	 EU.	 To	 an	
extent	 this	 comes	 through	 in	 the	 Draft	 Political	 Declaration;	 it	 demonstrates	 a	 relatively	
strong	 degree	 of	 commitment	 with	 the	 wording	 that	 both	 parties	 ‘will	 have	 equivalence	
frameworks’	in	place	rather	than	that	they	‘should	have’	them	in	place.	At	the	same	time,	a	
weaker	 degree	of	 commitment	 is	 then	 suggested	 via	 the	 use	 of	 ‘should’	 rather	 than	 ‘will’	
with	respect	to	both	sides	commencing	the	assessment	of	each	other’s	equivalence	regimes,	
and	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 principles	 underpinning	 future	 regulatory	 and	 supervisory	
cooperation.87		 Nonetheless,	 on	 a	 holistic	 and	 historical	 view,	 the	 deep	 interconnections	
between	the	two	jurisdictions	over	the	decades	with	respect	to	financial	governance	should	
mean	 that	 a	 form	of	 close	 cooperation	 is	 the	 aim.	 This	 is	 not	 only	 in	 relation	 to	mutually	
common	pursuits	 including	 ensuring	 financial	 stability	 and	 investor	protection,	 but	 also	 to	
enable	 the	 EU	 and	 UK	 to	 offer	 a	 stronger	 voice	 on	 the	 world	 stage,	 including	 within	 the	
international	standard	setting	bodies.			
	
If	 such	 an	 affiliation	 can	 be	 envisaged,	 then	 effective	 oversight	 and	 dispute	 resolution	
mechanisms	 are	 important	 to	 ensure	 they	 continue	 to	 conform	 to	 their	 regulatory	 and	
supervisory	 arrangements.88		 In	 such	 a	 scenario,	 it	may	 be	 that	 a	 combination	 of	 political	
channels	 and	 arbitration	 can	 provide	much	 of	 the	 heavy	 lifting.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 and	 as	
discussed	in	the	introduction,	an	intimate	UK/EU	arrangement	is	also	likely	to	be	conditional	
(on	the	EU’s	side)	on	there	being	a	role	 for	 the	CJEU.	At	 the	other	end	of	 the	spectrum,	 if	
there	is	a	no	deal	scenario,	or	if	mutual	relations	subsequently	collapse	down	the	line,	there	
will	 again	 be	 a	 need	 for	 robust	 dispute	 settlement	 systems.	 This	 will	 necessitate	 an	
independent	 quasi-judicial	 or	 judicial	 forum	 of	 a	 different	 kind,	 potentially	 drawing	
inspiration	from	the	WTO’s	highly	regarded	system.	
	
This	 section	 considers	 the	 strengths	 and	 shortcomings	of	 three	 frameworks	 as	well	 as	 the	
associated	 glitches	 that	 may	 arise	 when	 seeking	 to	 fashion	 a	 future	 dispute	 resolution	
system.	First,	it	discusses	the	bilateral	Swiss/EU	proposed	framework.	This	accords	with	the	
elements	 in	 the	 UK/EU	 WA	 and	 its	 approach	 can	 also	 be	 found	 in	 other	 EU/external	
agreements.	In	this	regard,	the	price	of	accessing	the	internal	market	is	the	presence	of	the	
CJEU.	 At	 the	 regional	 level,	 it	 considers	 the	 European	 Free	 Trade	 Area	 (‘EFTA’)	 Court,	
focusing	on	the	docking	scenario.	Although	more	elaborate,	it	has	relevance	for	the	UK	and	
its	 financial	 sector,	 including	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 political	 integrationist	 agenda.	 Yet	 if	 this	
proves	 to	be	a	non-starter,	 and	 if	negotiations	 stall	more	 fundamentally,	 the	 international	
WTO	settlement	system	merits	consideration.	This	is	a	well-developed	quasi-judicial	model,	










Swiss/EU	 relations	 have	 historically	 been	 governed	 via	 a	 large	 range	 of	 complex	 bilateral	
sectoral	 agreements.	 At	 present,	 in	 the	main,	 the	 application	 and	 interpretation	 of	 these	
arrangements	 is	 not	 overseen	 by	 the	 CJEU,	 rather	 disagreements	 are	 resolved	 through	
political	 and	 diplomatic	 dispute	 resolution	 via	 the	 Swiss/EU	 Joint	 Committees.89	In	 recent	
years,	however,	these	arrangements	have	been	the	subject	of	much	criticism	from	the	EU.90		





EEA	 regime),	 failing	which	 the	 EU	will	 not	 negotiate	 new	market	 access	 agreements	with	
Switzerland	 (and	 no	 significant	 new	 agreements	 have	 been	 concluded	 since	 2008). 92	
Negotiations	 are	 ongoing,	 and	 the	 draft	 Swiss/EU	 Framework	 takes	 a	 more	 dynamic	
approach	to	facilitate	agreements	being	updated	in	line	with	EU	law	developments.	Similar	
to	the	UK/EU	Draft	WA,	the	framework	proposes	referring	disputes	to	an	arbitration	Panel	
where	 the	 (current)	 relevant	 Joint	 Committee	 cannot	 resolve	 this.	 Questions	 on	 the	
interpretation	of	EU	law	are	to	be	referred	to	the	CJEU,	whose	ruling	will	bind	the	Panel,	and	





other	party	 can	 take	 compensatory	measures,	 including	 suspension	of	 aspects	or	 all	 of	 an	
agreement.	The	proportionality	of	such	elements	can	also	be	reviewed	by	the	Panel.96		






92	C.	 Tobler,	 ‘One	 of	Many	 Challenges	 after	 'Brexit':	 The	 Institutional	 Framework	 of	 an	 Alternative	
Agreement	 –	 Lessons	 from	 Switzerland	 and	 Elsewhere?’	 (2016)	 23	Maastricht	 Journal	 of	 European	
and	 Comparative	 Law	 575,	 578-579;	 Institute	 for	 Government,	 Dispute	 Resolution	 after	 Brexit	
(October	2017),	chapter	6.		
93	Draft	 Framework	Agreement	 between	 Switzerland	 and	 the	 EU	 (November	 2018)	 art	 4(2)	 and	 art	
10(3),	 see	 further	A.	Tomás,	The	Settlement	of	Disputes	Arising	 from	the	UK's	Withdrawal	 from	the	
EU:	 Study	 for	 the	European	Parliament	 (2017)	27;	 Swiss	Federal	Council,	Federal	Council	Decides	 to	
Launch	Consultations	on	the	Draft	Institutional	Agreement	(December	2018).	










negotiations	 with	 the	 ‘AMS	 States’	 (Andorra,	 San	Marino,	 and	Monaco).97		 In	 conjunction	
with	the	EU/UK	framework,	such	arrangements	reflect	the	EU’s	preference	for	engaging	with	
existing	models	 rather	 than	 creating	 bespoke	mechanisms.	Writ	 large,	 it	 points	 to	 a	 new	








As	 with	 the	 UK,	 the	 proposed	 role	 of	 the	 CJEU	 has	 not	 been	 warmly	 welcomed	 in	
Switzerland;	it	does	not	want	an	institutional	architecture	where	it	has	to	relinquish	formal	
sovereignty.	 More	 generally,	 however,	 the	 clear	 parallels	 between	 the	 Swiss/EU	
developments	can	only	be	taken	so	far;	 there	remain	 important	differences.	Particularly	 in	
relation	to	financial	governance,	the	Swiss	situation	has	evolved	from	being	a	system	quite	
apart	from	the	EU’s	towards	one	now	seeking	greater	integration	with	it.100		In	contrast,	UK	
financial	 governance	 currently	 conforms	 to	 the	 EU	 acquis,	 but	 following	 its	 exit,	 future	
regulatory	 and	 supervisory	 divergence	 may	 be	 anticipated	 over	 the	 longer	 term. 101	





with	that	of	the	EU’s.	 In	contrast,	 following	Brexit,	 the	UK	will	be	seeking	to	pursue	a	new	








two	 sides	 on	 an	 equal	 footing.	 The	 predominant	 stumbling	 block	 is	 the	 CJEU,	 which	 is	
regarded	as	unlikely	to	accept	this	option.103		In	particular,	the	CJEU	rejected	a	proposal	for	a	
joint	EU-EEA	Court	 in	 the	1990s	due	 to	 concerns	 that	 this	 could	pose	a	 threat	 to	 the	EU’s	
                                                      
97	C.	 Tobler	 (n	92);	 C.	 Tobler,	Oral	 Evidence	 to	House	of	 Lords:	Dispute	Resolution	and	Enforcement	
after	Brexit	(February	2018).		













The	 CJEU’s	 ‘very	 severe’	 Opinion	 was	 the	 subject	 of	 much	 criticism	 at	 the	 time.105		 The	
essence	of	 the	CJEU’s	 objection	was	 that	 it	 viewed	 the	 creation	of	 the	 EU-EEA	Court	 as	 a	
threat	to	its	own	position	as	the	supreme	authority	on	EU	law.106	Hartley	notes	that	one	can	







A	 further	 regional	model	 that	has	been	mooted	 is	 the	possibility	of	 the	UK	docking	at	 the	
EFTA	Court.	EFTA	 is	an	 intergovernmental	 (rather	than	supranational)	organisation	with	an	
approach	 focused	 on	 free	 trade	 and	 economic	 integration	 between	 its	members,	 the	 EU,	
and	 internationally.	 It	 has	 no	 political	 integrationist	 agenda. 108 		 The	 EFTA	 Court	 has	
jurisdiction	 over	 the	 EFTA	 States	 that	 are	 party	 to	 the	 European	 Economic	 Area	 (‘EEA’)	
Agreement	(Iceland,	Lichtenstein	and	Norway),	which	incorporates	EU	law	into	the	domestic	










on	 dispute	 settlement	 between	 EFTA	 States;	 actions	 for	 nullity	 of	 ESA	 decisions	 or	 for	
failures	 to	 act,	 which	 can	 be	 brought	 by	 a	 State,	 or	 a	 private	 party	 (subject	 to	 standing	
requirements);	and	damages	claims	can	also	be	brought	against	the	ESA.111	
















The	 Court	 has	 three	 judges,	 one	 nominated	 from	 each	 EEA-EFTA	 jurisdiction.	 	 An	
institutional	 two-pillar	 structure	 is	 in	place	whereby	Member	 State	matters	 are	dealt	with	
via	 the	 normal	 national/EU	 framework	 (including	 the	 infringement	 procedure,	 and	 the	
preliminary	ruling	procedure);	on	the	EEA/EFTA	side	there	are	parallel	mechanisms	in	place	
via	ESA	and	the	EFTA	Court.112		This	structure	has	been	endorsed	by	the	CJEU	(following	the	
rejection	 of	 the	 EU-EEA	 Court).	 It	 was	 acceptable	 to	 the	 CJEU	 as	 there	 were	 express	
assurances	that	the	CJEU	case	law	would	not	be	affected.113		
B	 The	UK	Docking	at	the	EFTA	Court?	
In	 relation	 to	 the	 Brexit	 situation,	 rather	 than	 the	 UK	 directly	 signing	 up	 to	 the	 EEA	 (the	
Norway	option),	the	UK	could	 instead	dock	with	the	ESA	and	EFTA	Court	meaning	that	the	








at	 a	minimum	 the	 EU	 elements)	 complied	with	 the	 UK’s	 obligations.	 Although	 this	would	
involve	 interpreting	 and	 applying	 a	 new	body	 of	 law,	 the	 EFTA	 institutions	 could	 be	 fairly	
well	equipped	to	do	so.115	The	ESA	would	have	the	ability	to	bring	infringement	proceedings	
against	the	UK	at	the	EFTA	Court	(sitting	with	the	UK	judge)	in	cases	of	non-implementation	
or	 other	 infringement	 cases	 concerning	 the	UK-EU	 arrangements.116		 The	 two-pillar	 set-up	









The	 ESA	 can	 (and	 occasionally	 has)	 brought	 a	 State	 to	 the	 Court	 anew	 if	 there	 is	 non-
compliance,	 although	 (to	 date)	 non-compliance	 is	 rare.	 In	 such	 an	 instance,	 however,	 the	
                                                      
112	C.	 Tobler,	 ‘One	 of	Many	 Challenges	 after	 'Brexit':	 The	 Institutional	 Framework	 of	 an	 Alternative	
Agreement	–	Lessons	from	Switzerland	and	Elsewhere?’	(n	92)	580-581.	
113	Opinion	1/92.	




117	H.	 Fredriksen	 (n	 106)	 175.	 Note	 that	 if	 an	 EFTA	 State	 breaches	 EEA	 law	 the	 State	 is	 obliged	 to	
provide	compensation	for	loss	and	damage	caused	to	economic	operators	and	individuals	under	the	






The	EFTA	docking	model	 is	undoubtedly	more	 intricate,	however,	 it	can	also	provide	more	
latitude.	This	could	be	an	attractive	structure	 for	 the	UK	 if	 it	 is	wishes	 to	pursue	a	deeper	
relationship	with	the	EU,	whilst	respecting	the	UK	Brexit	stance	on	the	CJEU.119		Further,	the	
EU	 already	 accepts	 the	 EFTA	 system;	 indeed,	 it	 proposed	 this	 to	 the	 Swiss	 as	 a	 possible	
solution	in	2013,	although	this	was	rejected	at	the	time	by	Switzerland	(Baudenbacher	notes	
that	this	was	in	all	likelihood	due	to	the	Swiss	Foreign	Office	following	its	traditional	policy	of	
preferring	 to	 avoid	 anything	 connected	 to	 the	 EEA	 system;	moreover	 at	 that	 time,	 it	 also	
harboured	a	long-term	vision	of	Switzerland	joining	the	EU).120			
	
Accordingly,	 given	 that	 the	 EU	 supports	 this	 system;	 the	 docking	 option	 could	 be	 a	







The	 EFTA	 Court	 also	 does	 not	 formally	 recognise	 the	 primacy	 and	 direct	 effect	 of	 EU	 law	
(although,	 as	 discussed	 below,	 it	 is	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 it).	 Due	 to	 constitutional	 and	






Despite	 this,	 it	 has	 a	 number	 of	 drawbacks.	 First,	 there	 would	 be	 considerable	 practical	
challenges	 in	 upscaling	 the	 system	 to	 tackle	 the	 considerably	 bigger	 caseload	 that	 would	
                                                      
118 H.	Fredriksen	(n	106110);	see	e.g.	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	v	Norway	para	49.	
119	House	of	 Lords	European	Union	Committee	 (n	62)	 chapter	2;	House	of	Commons	Exiting	 the	EU	
Committee,	 The	 Future	 UK-EU	 Relationship:	 Fourth	 Report	 of	 Session	 2017-19	 (2018)	 para	 108;	 J.	











125	M.	 Clifton	 (n	 105)	 13.	 Examples	 have	 included	 the	 more	 liberal	 functional	 (rather	 than	 strict	
institutional)	 approach	 used	 in	 deciding	 whether	 a	 body	 is	 a	 court	 or	 tribunal	 that	 can	 make	 a	





the	 UK	 was	 a	 founding	 EFTA	member,	 in	 the	 event	 the	 UK	 was	 required	 to	 re-join	 EFTA	
(which	 could	 be	 a	 requirement	 although	 this	would	 be	 up	 for	 negotiation)	 this	 should	 be	
relatively	straightforward.	It	would	involve	the	decision	of	the	existing	members	of	the	EFTA	





to	 the	 interpretation	 of	 EEA	 law	 (which	 is	 designed	 to	 ensure	 the	 EEA	 remains	 a	
homogenous	 trade	 zone).	 	 Both	 the	 EEA	 Agreement,	 and	 article	 3	 of	 the	 ESA/Court	
Agreement	includes	this	rule,	which	provides	that	CJEU	case	law	must	be	followed	up	to	the	
point	 of	 signature	 of	 the	 EEA	 Agreement,	 and	 that	 ‘due	 regard’	 be	 given	 to	 subsequent	
judgments.128	As	 Tobler	 argues,	 in	 practice	 the	 EFTA	 Court	 has	 gone	 beyond	 this	 in	 the	
interests	of	market	 integration,	and	has	established	a	general	presumption	that	 identically	






Be	 that	 as	 it	 may,	 the	 EU’s	 support	 for	 a	 bespoke	 UK/EFTA	 docking	 model	 will	 in	 all	
probability	be	conditioned	upon	the	homogeneity	requirement	(which	was	an	issue	with	the	




also	 prove	 politically	 unpalatable,	 in	 addition	 to	 simply	 substituting	 the	 CJEU	 for	 another	
European	Court.132		
	
A	 further	 jurisdictional	 challenge	 could	 emerge	 when	 the	 current	 framework	 is	 directly	
applied	to	UK/EU	financial	governance	disputes.	The	present	EFTA	model	provides	that,	for	
                                                      




129	C.	 Tobler,	 ‘One	 of	Many	 Challenges	 after	 'Brexit':	 The	 Institutional	 Framework	 of	 an	 Alternative	












instance,	 in	 the	 situation	 where	 the	 Commission	 alleges	 that	 the	 UK	 has	 failed	 to	 fully	
implement	 the	UK/EU	agreement	or	 is	diverging	 from	aspects	of	 it,	 the	ESA	can	decide	 to	
bring	 proceedings	 at	 the	 EFTA	 Court.	 The	 UK	 could	 then	 be	 declared	 compliant	 or	 non-
compliant	 (and	 if	 declared	 non-compliant	 it	 would	 be	 legally	 obliged	 to	 implement	 the	
ruling,	although	compliance	could	not	be	forced	and	it	would	not	face	any	financial	penalty).	
In	the	situation	where	the	UK	wished	to	challenge	EU	action,	however,	(which	could	relate	
to	 the	 same	 scenario,	 such	 as	 the	 Commission	 threatening	 to	 revoke	 an	 equivalence	
assessment	 due	 to	 the	 UK’s	 alleged	 regulatory	 divergence),	 then	 the	 current	 framework	
means	 that	 a	 Member	 State	 or	 an	 EU	 Institution	 would	 be	 in	 charge	 of	 bringing	 such	 a	
complaint	to	the	CJEU	under	article	263	TFEU	(again	a	non-privileged	applicant	such	as	a	UK	
business	 could	 also	 attempt	 to	 bring	 a	 claim	 but	 this	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 satisfying	 the	
standing	 rules).	 Although	 as	 discussed	 above,	 it	 is	 conceivable	 that	 either	 another	
jurisdiction	 or	 the	 Parliament	 may	 be	 willing	 to	 instigate	 action,	 this	 could	 be	 overly	
optimistic.	In	any	event,	there	is	also	the	fact	that	this	framework	could	end	up	with	the	EU	
marking	 its	 own	 homework.	 Nonetheless,	 perhaps	 this	 issue	 could	 be	 ameliorated	 by	 the	






situation	where	 the	 ESA/EFTA	Court	 assesses	 the	UK	 to	 be	 compliant	with	 its	 obligations,	
this	 legal	 ruling	 from	an	 independent	 court	 should	 send	a	 clear	 signal	 to	 the	EU,	of	which	
due	regard	should	be	taken.134		In	this	regard	there	is	an	analogy	in	the	‘clear	salute’	to	the	
EFTA	 Court	 by	 the	 EU	 and	 Member	 States,	 which	 occurred	 in	 the	 Icesave	 dispute,	 (in	
something	of	a	harbinger	of	 the	 subsequent	Brexit	 saga	 to	 come,	 this	 forum	was	 selected	
after	 considerable	 consultation,	 including	 two	 Icelandic	 referendums	 where	 the	 voters	
rejected	proposed	 solutions).135		 The	 EFTA	Court	was	 used	 in	 Icesave	 to	 decide	 a	 financial	
governance	dispute	brought	by	the	ESA	(with	the	formal	intervention	by	the	Commission	in	
support	of	it)	between	Iceland,	and	the	UK	and	the	Netherlands.136	It	was	claimed	that	since	
the	 Icelandic	deposit	 guarantee	 fund	 in	question	was	unable	 to	 compensate	depositors	 in	
the	UK	and	the	Netherlands	in	relation	to	the	insolvent	bank	Landsbanki,	Iceland	had	to	step	
in.	 The	 EFTA	 Court	 ultimately	 dismissed	 this	 action,	 an	 outcome	 that	 the	 EU,	 the	UK	 and	





                                                      
133	A.	Arnull	(n	61).		
134	Baudenbacher	 argues	 that	 although	 the	 EU	 could	 in	 principle	 open	 legal	 proceedings,	 this	 has	
never	occurred	and	that	 the	EU	could	compromise	 itself	 to	attack	a	well-reasoned	 judgment	of	 the	
EFTA	Court,	(note	as	well	that	in	the	event	of	judicial	conflict	(EFTA/CJEU),	for	the	EEA/EU	States,	 in	
principle,	there	could	be	dispute	settlement	under	article	111	EEA	where	parties	can	request	a	CJEU	
ruling,	 although	 as	 the	 EFTA	 side	 would	 have	 to	 accept	 this	 CJEU	 ruling,	 this	 is	 unlikely	 to	 ever	








Moving	 to	 the	 global	 level,	 the	 WTO	 is	 an	 international	 system	 with	 164	 member	
jurisdictions,	and	it	has	many	roles,	including	negotiating	and	operating	of	global	trade	rules,	
as	well	as	acting	as	a	forum	to	settle	trade	disputes.	 	 Its	dispute	settlement	system	(that	is	




EU/UK	agreement	emerges.	Particularly	with	 respect	 to	 financial	governance	access	 rights,	





get	 the	UK	 so	 far,	 however.	 For	 instance,	 the	GATS	 ‘most	 favoured	nation’	 clause	 (that	 in	
principle	provides	that	each	WTO	member	extend	preferential	 treatment	to	all	other	WTO	
members)	does	not	apply	 to	 favourable	 treatment	within	systems	of	economic	 integration	
such	as	the	EU’s.138	Moreover,	 the	WTO/GATS	regime	also	permits	governments	to	restrict	
cross-border	financial	services	on	the	basis	of	prudential	reasons,	such	as	ensuring	financial	







WA	 and	 Political	 Declaration	 discussed	 above,	 the	 future	 relationship	 could	 also	 be	
influenced	 by	 the	 WTO	 settlement	 mechanisms.	 This	 could	 include	 using	 the	 WTO	
settlement	 system	 as	 either	 ‘the’	 or	 at	 least	 ‘a’	 choice	 of	 dispute	 resolution	 system.	 The	




own	 dispute	 resolution	 systems)	 choose	 to	 use	 the	 WTO	 set-up	 for	 dispute	 settlement,	
framing	it	as	an	issue	concerning	WTO	obligations.140	This	can	be	explained	by	a	number	of	
reasons	including	its	informal	system	of	precedent	that	bolsters	certainty,	the	resources	and	
support	 offered	 by	 the	 WTO	 Secretariat,	 and	 the	 respect	 the	 WTO	 commands,	 which	
generates	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 decisions.141	Indeed,	 its	 dispute	 settlement	 regime	 has	 been	











indirect	 effect	 of	 WTO	 law,	 plus	 the	 flexibility	 inherent	 within	 the	 WTO’s	 enforcement	
mechanisms	 (including	 that	 there	 is	 nothing	 that	 it	 can	do	 to	 force	 compliance	within	 the	
internal	legal	order)	are	key	components	in	ensuring	compatibility	with	the	Treaties.143		
C	 WTO	Dispute	Settlement	Stages		
There	 are	 three	 particular	 stages	 to	 the	 WTO	 dispute	 system:	 first,	 consultations	 occur	
between	the	disputing	States.	If	a	mutually	agreed	solution	cannot	be	found	within	a	60-day	
period, 144 	the	 dispute	 settlement	 body	 (‘DSB’)	 (a	 general	 committee	 of	 ambassadorial	
representatives	of	all	the	WTO	members)	will	establish	an	arbitration	Panel	to	consider	the	
merits	 of	 the	 dispute	 and	 produce	 a	 Panel	 report.145		 Following	 its	 due	 consideration,	 the	
final	 Panel	 report	 will	 be	 adopted,	 and	 in	 practice	 adoption	 is	 ‘de	 facto	 automatic’.146	
Conclusions	 are	 rarely	 overturned	 as	 this	 (now)	 requires	 ‘negative’	 or	 ‘reverse’	 consensus	









technical	 fix	 will	 be	 sufficient,149	in	 principle	 such	 mechanisms	 could	 be	 capable	 of	 being	
applied	in	relation	to	future	disputes	between	the	UK	and	EU.150		
	
In	 relation	 to	 enforcement;	 the	 State	 that	 loses	must	 follow	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	
report;	 if	 it	 fails	 to	 comply,	 then	 it	 has	 to	 enter	 into	 negotiations	 with	 the	 complaining	
State(s),	and	determine	mutually	acceptable	compensation	(such	as	tariff	reductions).	If	this	
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Panels	 Established	 to	 Review	 US	 Steel	 and	 Aluminium	 Tariffs,	 Countermeasures	 on	 US	 Imports	
(November	2018).	
146	G.	Messenger	(n	11)	234.	




150	See	 e.g.	 N.	 Sen,	 The	 Appellate	 Body	 in	 Crisis	 (Linklaters)	 (2018);	 EU	 (and	 selected	 other	 WTO	
delegations),	 Proposals	 to	 Reform	 the	 WTO	 Appellate	 Body:	 WT/GC/W/752,	 WT/GC/W/753	
(November	2018).	
 28 
is	 not	 agreed,	 the	 complainant	 can	 ask	 the	 DSB	 for	 permission	 to	 retaliate	 to	 encourage	
compliance	 (such	 as	 blocking	 imports;	 raising	 tariff	 duties).	 	 Accordingly,	 enforcement	 is	
flexible	 rather	 than	 a	 one-way	 street,	 and	 there	 is	 nothing	 that	 can	 force	 execution	 in	
domestic	law.151	
	
The	 system	 is	 generally	 regarded	 as	 a	 successful	 one;	 the	 negative	 consensus	 aspect	
facilitates	decision-making	and	there	are	clear	timeframes	that	avoid	blockages.152		The	WTO	





Particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 financial	 governance	disputes,	 Lang	makes	 a	 powerful	 argument	
that	the	WTO	dispute	settlement	set-up	could	have	the	potential	to	play	a	valuable	role.154		
Historically,	the	WTO’s	dispute	settlement	organs	have	shown	willing	to	step	in	where	there	
has	 been	 a	 failure	 to	 follow	 good	 regulatory	 practice	 (such	 as	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 lack	 of	









certificates	 granted	 to	 service	 suppliers	 in	 foreign	 jurisdictions,	 and	 to	 recognise	 the	
prudential	 measures	 of	 another	 country.158	Further,	 although	 the	 GATS	 wording	 makes	








of	 International	Trade	Courts	and	Tribunals	 (CUP	2018)	57	 (average	 times	 to	 receive	 final	 reports	 is	
within	a	 year	and	a	half).	At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 is	no	possibility	of	direct	 compensation	 for	non-
state	entities;	and	 the	UK’s	 retaliation	capacity	will	dwindle	 from	no	 longer	being	a	Member	State,	







enable	 governments	 to	 take	 measures	 (including	 restricting	 cross-border	 services)	 for	 prudential	
reasons	including	to	ensure	financial	stability.	





Concerning	 possible	 future	 challenges,	 these	 could	 be	 procedural	 or	 substantive.	 As	
discussed	 earlier	 in	 the	 article,	 procedural	 failings	 could	 include	 a	 refusal	 to	 grant	
equivalence,	 or	 an	 extensive	 delay	 in	 the	 equivalence	 process.	 In	 principle	 these	 types	 of	
complaints	 could	 constitute	 the	 basis	 of	 a	WTO	 dispute.	160		 Lang	 identifies,	 however	 that	
this	may	 not	 be	 entirely	 straightforward	 as	 the	GATS	 regime	 (article	 VII	 and	 the	 Financial	
Services	 Annex)	 only	 applies	 where	 recognition	 has	 been	 granted	 and	 another	 state	 is	
wishing	 to	be	 similarly	 recognised.	 It	does	not	appear	 to	apply	where	 there	 is	a	 refusal	 to	
grant	 recognition	 or	 there	 is	 a	 withdrawal	 of	 recognition	 in	 the	 scenario	where	 no	 other	
State	has	been	accorded	similar	recognition.	This	could	generate	difficulties	for	the	UK	if	 it	
wishes	 to	make	 the	 latter	 type	of	 challenge,	particularly	 given	 its	 current	 levels	of	market	
access	may	surpass	that	of	other	non-EU	States.161		
	
In	 relation	 to	 potential	 substantive	 challenges,	 Lang	 argues	 that	 (subject	 to	 a	 number	 of	
caveats)	the	WTO	dispute	settlement	system	could	be	capable	of	scrutinising	EU	equivalence	
assessments	 for	 a	 lack	 of	 impartiality	 in	 comparison	 to	 other	 countries	 (using	 a	 relative	
standard).	 The	 GATS	 terms	 (both	 article	 VII	 and	 the	 Annex	 para	 3)	 could	 enable	 such	
complaints,	and	although	substantive	disputes	could	be	extremely	delicate,	the	WTO	system	
has	 previously	 been	 receptive	 to	 ensuring	 Members	 are	 impartial	 and	 not	 engaging	 in	
favouritism	 with	 respect	 to	 particular	 trading	 jurisdictions.162	Lang	 also	 suggests	 that	 the	
system	could	be	capable	of	applying	in	relation	to	other	categories	of	substantive	challenge.	







There	 are	 undoubtedly	 limitations	 to	 the	WTO’s	 dispute	 system.	 These	 include	 the	 GATS	
text,	how	far	it	can	in	fact	extend	to	equivalence	determinations,	as	well	as	more	pragmatic	
factors	 such	 as	 the	 time	 that	 dispute	 resolution	may	 take.	Moreover,	 as	 observed	 above,	
given	the	UK’s	current	political	climate,	transplanting	the	CJEU	for	the	WTO	may	not	sit	well	
within	 parts	 of	 the	 UK.165		 Yet,	 despite	 the	 political	 challenges,	 the	 potential	 for	 this	
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(adopted	November	1998)	 (where	the	Appellate	Body	held	that	the	rigidity	of	the	US	regulations	 in	
question	 and	 its	 absence	 of	 procedural	 standards	 of	 fairness	 and	 due	 process	 in	 its	 certification	
process	 with	 respect	 to	 	 foreign	 states’	 regulation	 led	 the	 Body	 to	 conclude	 the	 US	measure	 was	















ongoing	 Brexit	 debate,	 particularly	 the	 topical	 questions	 generated	 by	 UK/EU	 financial	
governance	 and	 post-Brexit	 dispute	 settlement.	 The	 article	 has	 analysed	 the	 benefits	 and	
disadvantages	 of	 three	 possible	 systems	 via	 an	 original	 cross-model	 evaluation	 and	 it	 has	
explored	 the	 connected	 impediments	 that	 may	 be	 encountered	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 a	 post-
Brexit	dispute	settlement	system.	The	article’s	overall	analysis	is	also	premised	on	the	basis	
that	 functional	 interests	 should	prevail	 in	 the	Brexit	negotiations,	whilst	 remaining	acutely	
mindful	of	the	fact	that	Brexit	itself	is	not	a	rational	venture.	
	
It	 is	 a	 herculean	 task	 to	 balance	 both	 parties’	 expectations	 and	 no	 option	 will	 ever	 be	
perfectly	 in	 keeping	 with	 either	 side’s	 red	 lines.	 The	 various	mechanisms	 explored	 in	 the	
article’s	preceding	section	 illustrate	that	a	number	of	different	dispute	settlement	vehicles	
may	be	engaged	for	a	future	UK/EU	partnership,	depending	particularly	on	whether	or	not	a	
strong	 alliance	 can	 emerge.	 If	 a	 close	 UK/EU	 alliance	 can	 develop	 over	 the	 longer	 term,	
although	 the	 Swiss/EU	 draft	 framework	 (as	 currently	 utilised	 within	 the	 UK/EU	 draft	
documentation)	 could	 be	 engaged,	 the	 regional	 EFTA	 docking	 model	 could	 prove	 the	







concessions	 that	 could	 be	 then	 claimed	 by	 the	 other.	 The	 EU’s	 connecting	 of	 technical	
decisions	 on	 Swiss	 stock	 exchange	 equivalence	 with	 the	 progress	 of	 the	 EU/Swiss	
constitutional	 discussions	 is	 also	 notable.	 It	 offers	 a	 glimpse	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 approach	





engaging	 in	a	process	of	 increased	 integration	with	 the	EU	 (albeit	one	 that	has	hit	various	
blockades);	the	UK	is	commencing	an	extended	process	of	extraction	and	where	any	future	
new	 UK/EU	 agreement	 (from	 the	 UK	 side)	 is	 envisaged	 as	 not	 being	 conditional	 on	 the	
substantive	 harmonisation	 of	 laws	 with	 the	 EU	 or	 the	 referral	 of	 disagreements	 to	 the	
jurisdiction	of	the	CJEU.	Moreover,	as	identified,	over	the	short-medium	term,	although	the	
draft	WA’s	mechanisms	reflect	a	measured	compromise,	over	 the	 longer	 term,	utilising	an	
independent	forum	would	avoid	the	risk	of	one	party	marking	their	own	homework.		
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but	 it	 offers	 a	 number	 of	 benefits.	 EFTA	 has	 no	 political	 integrationist	 agenda,	 it	 takes	 a	
common-sense	 approach,	 and	 it	 respects	 the	 UK’s	 views	 on	 the	 CJEU.	 The	 EU	 has	 also	
previously	 indicated	 it	 is	 amenable	 to	 this	 option	 with	 the	 Swiss.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 the	
homogeneity	 principle	may	not	wash	well	 politically	 in	 the	UK	and	 there	 could	be	 serious	
jurisdictional	 questions,	 most	 clearly	 highlighted	 where	 the	 UK	 wishes	 to	 challenge	 EU	
actions.	Within	 the	current	model,	 such	complaints	would	remain	part	of	 the	CEJU’s	 remit	






If	 the	 progress	 of	 the	 future	UK/EU	 negotiations	 hit	 further	 blockades,	 however,	 a	 looser	
affiliation	that	draws	on	the	WTO	model	would	appear	prudent,	indeed	this	may	be	the	only	
realistic	 basis	 on	 which	 to	 tailor	 future	 dispute	 settlement	 mechanisms.168		 Although	 the	




respect	 to	 the	UK	and	EU’s	equivalence	process,	 including	acting	as	a	 type	of	watchdog	 in	
relation	to	any	extraneous	elements	filtering	into	the	decision-making.	Given	such	elements	
have	arisen	with	Switzerland,	it	is	not	fanciful	to	envisage	this	could	take	also	place	with	the	
UK,	 even	 if	 not	 couched	 in	 such	 terms.	 Nevertheless,	 for	 the	 WTO	 system	 to	 have	 any	
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